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Core allocations may not be Walras allocations in any




We consider an exchange economy where every commodity can be consumed
only in integer amounts. Inoue [Inoue, T., 2005. Do pure indivisibilities prevent
core equivalence? Core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with purely in-
divisible commodities only. Journal of Mathematical Economics 41, 571-601] proved
that in such an economy with a continuum of agents, the core coincides with the
set of Walras allocations. We show that this equivalence holds only in an atomless
economy by giving two examples of the sequence of replica economies such that in
any replica economy, there exists a core allocation that is not a Walras allocation.
JEL classication: C71; D51
Keywords: Indivisible commodities; Core; Walras equilibrium; Strong core; cost-
minimized Walras equilibrium
1 Introduction
We consider an economy where every commodity is available only in integer amounts. In
such an economy, the size of the cores depend on which notion of improvement is adopted.
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The improvement dening Inoue's [2] core requires that some members in a coalition can
be better o without changing the others' consumption vectors. On the other hand, the
improvement dening the strong core requires that some members in a coalition can be
better o without worsening the others' utilities. By denition, the core is larger (possibly
strictly larger) than the strong core.
Inoue [2] proved that in an atomless economy, an economy with a continuum of agents,
the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations. We show that this equivalence on
the core holds only in an atomless economy by giving examples of the sequence of replica
economies such that in any replica economy, there exists a core allocation that is not a
Walras allocation. This is a contrasting result to the equivalence on the strong core. Inoue
[4, 5] proved that, regardless of in a large nite economy or in an atomless economy, the
strong core coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations. A cost-minimized
Walras equilibrium is a state where, under some price vector, all agents satisfy not only
the preference maximization but also the cost minimization.
In an atomless economy, nitely many agents can be negligible, but in a nite economy,
any one agent cannot be negligible. The core is subject to this dierence between an
atomless economy and a nite economy, although the strong core is not. In our examples,
in any replica economy, there exists a core allocation that is not a Walras allocation by
reason that only one agent does not satisfy the preference maximization. In the limit
atomless economy of the sequence of replica economies, only one agent can be negligible
and, therefore, we can obtain the equivalence between the core and the set of Walras
allocations.
In an economy with divisible commodities, approximate equilibrium such as pseudo-
equilibrium or quasi-equilibrium is considered when we argue the convergence of the core.
Anderson [1] proposed a measure of non-Walras degree of core allocations. In contrast, we
focus only on whether or not a core allocation is a Walras allocation, and we do not argue
the relation between the core and any approximate equilibrium. This is because in an
economy where every commodity is indivisible, pseudo-equilibrium or quasi-equilibrium
is not an approximate concept any longer; there exists no sucient condition for these
equilibria to be actual Walras equilibria. Strictly speaking, Anderson's [1] measure is the
distance between core allocation and quasi-equilibrium and, therefore, it is not a useful
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measure for our model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 gives two
examples of the sequence of replica economies such that every replica economy has a core
allocation that is not a Walras allocation.
2 Model
The model is essentially same as that of Inoue [2, 4, 5]. We consider an economy with
L indivisible commodities, where L is a natural number with L  2. Every commodity
can be consumed only in integer amounts. Let A be the set of agents. We assume
that every agent has the same consumption set ZL+, the set of L-dimensional nonnegative
integral vectors. Every agent a is characterized by his preference relation -a and his
endowment vector e(a) 2 ZL+. Every preference relation is assumed to be a reexive,
transitive, complete, and weakly monotone binary relation on ZL+.1 Let P be the set of all
preference relations on ZL+. An economy E is a mapping of the set A of agents to agents'
characteristics P ZL+. Given a nite economy E : A! P ZL+, #A <1, an allocation





We give the denitions of the strong core, the core, a cost-minimized Walras equilib-
rium, and a Walras equilibrium.
Denition 1. Let E : A! P ZL+ be a nite economy. An exactly feasible allocation f
is a strong core allocation for E if there exists no nonempty subset S of A and a mapping
g : S ! ZL+ such that
g(a) %a f(a) for all a 2 S;




The set of all strong core allocations for E is called the strong core of E and is denoted by
CS(E).
Denition 2. Let E : A ! P  ZL+ be a nite economy. An exactly feasible allocation
f is a core allocation for E if there exists no nonempty subset S of A and a mapping
1A preference relation - on ZL+ is weakly monotone if x - y for every x; y 2 ZL+ with x  y.
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g : S ! ZL+ such that
g(a) a f(a) for some a 2 S;




The set of all core allocations for E is called the core of E and is denoted by C(E).
Denition 3. Let E : A ! P  ZL+ be a nite economy. A pair (p; f) of a price vector
p 2 QL+ and an exactly feasible allocation f : A ! ZL+ is called a cost-minimized Walras
equilibrium of E if
(i) for all a 2 A, p  f(a)  p  e(a);
(ii) for all a 2 A, if x 2 ZL+ and x a f(a), then p  x > p  e(a); and
(iii) for all a 2 A, if x 2 ZL+ and x %a f(a), then p  x  p  e(a).
An allocation f is a cost-minimized Walras allocation for E if (p; f) is a cost-minimized
Walras equilibrium for some p 2 QL+. The set of all cost-minimized Walras allocations for
E is denoted by WCM(E).
Denition 4. Let E : A ! P  ZL+ be a nite economy. A pair (p; f) of a price vector
p 2 QL+ and an exactly feasible allocation f : A ! ZL+ is called a Walras equilibrium
of E if (p; f) satises conditions (i) and (ii) in the denition of cost-minimized Walras
equilibrium. The set of all Walras allocations for E is denoted by W (E).
Some remarks are in order. By denition, the strong core is a subset of the core, and
every cost-minimized Walras allocation is a Walras allocation, i.e., CS(E)  C(E) and
WCM(E)  W (E) for every economy E . By an argument similar to the proof of the rst
welfare theorem, we can show that every cost-minimized Walras allocation is a strong
core allocation, and every Walras allocation is a core allocation, i.e., WCM(E)  CS(E)
and W (E)  C(E) for every economy E .
Because of the indivisibility, the core and the set of Walras allocations can be empty
(see Inoue [2, Example 3.2]). Therefore, their subsets, the strong core and the set of
cost-minimized Walras allocations, can be empty, too (see Inoue [4, Example 2]).
4
Inoue [4] proved that if agents' types are nite and if every type has a suciently large
number of agents, then strong core allocations are cost-minimized Walras allocations, i.e.,
CS(E)  WCM(E) for suciently large economy E .2
Even in an atomless economy where there exists a continuum of agents, we can dene
the strong core, the core, cost-minimized Walras equilibrium, and Walras equilibrium
in similar manners. Inoue [2, 5] proved that in an atomless economy E1, if endowment
allocation is essentially bounded and if agents' preference relations are nonsatiated in every
positive direction [for every x 2 ZL+ and every h 2 f1; : : : ; Lg, there exists a k 2 Z++
such that x + kh  x], then the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations, and
the strong core coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations, i.e., C(E1) =
W (E1) and CS(E1) = WCM(E1). Therefore, under some assumptions, regardless of in a
large nite economy or in an atomless economy, the strong core coincides with the set of
cost-minimized Walras allocations. In contrast, as we will show in the next section, the
equivalence on the core holds only in an atomless economy and there exists an arbitrarily
large nite economy whose core is strictly larger than the set of Walras allocations.
3 Examples
The following two examples give the sequence of replica economies where every replica
economy has a core allocation that is not a Walras allocation, and only in the limit
atomless economy of the sequence, the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations.
In the rst example, the strong core and the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations are
both empty in a suciently large replica economy, whereas in the second example, these
sets are nonempty in any replica economy.
Example 1. Let L = 2. Every agent has the same preference relation -t and the same
endowment vector et; there exists only one type of agents. The endowment vector et of
2Strictly speaking, to hold the inclusion CS(E)  WCM (E), Inoue [4] put a further assumption on
agents' preference relations -; there exists a k 2 Z with k  2 such that for every x; y 2 ZL+ and every
h; i 2 f1; : : : ; Lg with h 6= i, if x(h)  1, then x   h + ki  x, where h is the hth unit vector. In
the examples in the next section, agents' preference relations satisfy this condition and, therefore, we can






Figure 1: Endowment vector and indierence curves of agents
agents is given by (1; 2). The preference relation -t of agents is represented by a utility
function
u(x; y) =
8<: 3:5 if (x; y) = (3; 0);x+ y otherwise:
Although the indierence curves drawn in Figure 1 are not convex, this preference re-
lation is discretely convex in the sense that for every w 2 Z2+, co(fz 2 Z2+ ju(z) 
u(w)g) \ Z2 = fz 2 Z2+ ju(z)  u(w)g.3 For every n 2 Z++, economy En consists of n
agents f(t; 1); : : : ; (t; n)g who have preference relation -t and endowment vector et. This
economy is the same as the economy from Example 3 of Inoue [4].
Let en be the endowment allocation for En, i.e., en(t; i) = et for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
For every n 2 Z++, under price vector p = (1; p(2)) with 1=2 < p(2) < 1, a pair (p; en) is a
Walras equilibrium, but is not a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium. Since en is a unique
Walras allocation for En, we have ; = WCM(En) ( W (En) = feng for every n 2 Z++. One
can show that CS(En) = ; for every n  4 and, therefore, we have the equivalence on the
strong core: CS(En) = ; = WCM(En) for every n  4.
3Some properties of the discrete convexity are summarized in Section 4 of Inoue [3]. The discrete
convexity of preference relation is related to the nonemptiness of the weak core dened by the strong
improvement.
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For every n  3, dene an allocation fn for En by
fn(t; i) =
8>>><>>>:
(2; 1) if i = 1,
(0; 3) if i = 2,
(1; 2) if i  3.
Note that fn 2 C(En) and fn 62 W (En) for every n  3. Hence, for every n  3, feng =
W (En) ( C(En). Note also that under price vector p = (1; p(2)) with 1=2 < p(2) < 1, all
agents but agent (t; 1) satisfy the preference maximization under budget constraint.
We next consider the limit economy of the sequence (En)n of nite economies. Let B
be the -algebra of the Borel subsets in [0; 1] and  be the Borel measure on [0; 1]. An
atomless economy E1 : ([0; 1];B; ) ! P  Z2+ is dened by E1(a) = (-t; et) for every
a 2 [0; 1]. Let e1 : [0; 1]! Z2+ be the endowment allocation for economy E1. We require







e1d. The core and a Walras equilibrium of E1 are dened in
similar manners to those of a nite economy. Note that e1 is a Walras allocation under
the price vector p = (1; p(2)) with 1=2 < p(2) < 1. In addition, e1 is a unique Walras
allocation in the sense that g = e -a.e. for every Walras allocation g for E1. Therefore,
from Theorem 3.1 of Inoue [2], ; 6= W (E1) = C(E1) follows. This atomless economy can
be regarded as the limit economy of the sequence (En)n of nite economies in the following
sense. For every n 2 Z++, dene n : [0; 1]! f(t; 1); : : : ; (t; n)g by
n(i) =
8<: (t; 1) if i 2 [0; 1=n];(t; j) if i 2](j   1)=n; j=n], j = 2; : : : ; n:
For every n 2 Z++, let Bn be the algebra on [0; 1] generated by f[0; 1=n]; ]1=n; 2=n]; : : : ; ](n 
1)=n; 1]g and n be the Borel measure restricted to Bn. For every n 2 Z++, we dene an
economy ~En : ([0; 1];Bn; n)! P Z2+ by ~En(a) = (-t; et) for every a 2 [0; 1]. We require
that allocations for ~En are Bn-measurable. Then, for every n 2 Z++, economy ~En can be
identied with economy En. Since  (E1) 1 = n  ( ~En) 1 holds for every n 2 Z++ and B
is the -algebra generated by
S1
n=1 Bn, economy E1 can be regarded as the limit economy
of the sequence (En)n of nite economies.
For every n 2 Z++, since fn 2 C(En) and fn 62 W (En), we have fn  n 2 C( ~En) and






Figure 2: Endowment vector and indierence curves of agents of type s
consumption vector fn n(a) of agent a 2 [0; 1=n] is not the demand vector, whereas the
consumption vectors fn  n(a) of the other agents a 2 [0; 1] n [0; 1=n] are their demand
vectors. One can show that n  (fn  n) 1 converges weakly to   e 11 . Therefore,
(fn  n)n3 is a sequence of core allocations that are not Walras allocations for every
economy ~En, but its limit allocation e1 is a Walras allocation for the limit economy E1
under the price vector p = (1; p(2)) with 1=2 < p(2) < 1.
Example 2. Let L = 2. There exist two types fs; tg of agents. The endowment vectors
of types s and t are given by es = (0; 4) and et = (2; 0). The preference relations -s and
-t of types s and t are represented by the following utility functions:
us(x; y) =
8<: 2x+ y if x  2,(x+ 2y + 6)=2 if x  3,
ut(x; y) =
8<: x+ y if x+ y  1 or x+ y  4,2 if 2  x+ y  3.
For every n 2 Z++, economy En consists of n agents of type s and n agents of type t. Let
An = f(s; 1); : : : ; (s; n); (t; 1); : : : ; (t; n)g be the set of agents of economy En. Let en be






Figure 3: Endowment vector and indierence curves of agents of type t
For every n  2, dene an allocation fn for En by
fn(s; i) =
8<: (1; 3) if i = 1;(2; 1) if i  2;
fn(t; i) =
8<: (1; 1) if i = 1;(0; 3) if i  2:
Then, for every n  2, fn 62 W (En). Note that under price vector p = (3; 2), all agents
but agent (s; 1) satisfy the preference maximization under budget constraint. We prove
that fn is a core allocation.
Claim 1. For every n  2, fn 2 C(En).
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that fn 62 C(En) for some n  2. Then, there exists a
coalition ; 6= S  An and a mapping g : S ! Z2+ such that
g(r; i) r fn(r; i) for some (r; i) 2 S;
g(r; i) = fn(r; i) for all (r; i) 2 S n f(r0; i0) 2 S j g(r0; i0) r0 fn(r0; i0)g, andP




Let p = (3; 2). Then, we have
p  (fn(s; 1)  en(s; 1)) = 1;
p  (fn(s; i)  en(s; i)) = 0 for every i  2;
p  (fn(t; 1)  en(t; 1)) =  1; and
p  (fn(t; i)  en(t; i)) = 0 for every i  2.
Let B = f(r; i) 2 S j g(r; i) r fn(r; i)g. Since g(r; i) = fn(r; i) for every (r; i) 2 S nB, we
have X
(r;i)2SnB
p  (g(r; i)  en(r; i))   1:
From Figures 2 and 3 of agents' indierence curves, it follows that for every (r; i) 2 B,
p  (g(r; i)  en(r; i))  2:
Since B 6= ;, we have X
(r;i)2S
p  (g(r; i)  en(r; i))  1;
which contradicts the exact feasibility of g within S.
Thus, for every n  2, W (En) ( C(En).
For every n 2 Z++, dene allocations gn and hn for En by
gn(r; i) =
8<: (2; 0) if r = s;(0; 4) if r = t;
hn(r; i) =
8<: (2; 2) if r = s;(0; 2) if r = t:
It can be shown without diculty that for every n 2 Z++, WCM(En) = fgn; hng. Thus,
by Inoue's [4] theorem, WCM(En) = fgn; hng = CS(En) for n large enough. As we will
show in the following, this equality holds for every n 2 Z++.
Claim 2. For every n 2 Z++, CS(En) = fgn; hng.
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Proof. Let n 2 Z++ and let f 2 CS(En). We rst assume that there exists an agent (t; i0)
of type t such that 2  f (1)(t; i0) + f (2)(t; i0)  3. We will show that f = gn.
Let p = (1; 1). Let (s; j0) be an agent of type s such that p  (f(s; j0)  en(s; j0))  0.
We will prove that f(s; j0) = (2; 2). Suppose, to the contrary, that f(s; j0) 6= (2; 2). Let
S = f(s; j0); (t; i0)g. Dene k : S ! Z2+ by
k(s; j0) = (2; 2) and k(t; i0) = (0; 2):
Since 2  f (1)(t; i0) + f (2)(t; i0)  3, we have k(t; i0) t f(t; i0). Since p  (f(s; j0)  
en(s; j0))  0 and f(s; j0) 6= (2; 2), we have
k(s; j0) = (2; 2) s f(s; j0):
Also, we have k(s; j0) + k(t; i0) = en(s; j0) + en(t; i0). This contradicts that f 2 CS(En).
Thus, f(s; j0) = (2; 2).
Therefore, p  (f(s; j)   en(s; j))  0 for every j 2 f1; : : : ; ng. By the individual
rationality of f , p  (f(t; i)   en(t; i))  0 for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Thus, by the exact
feasibility of f , we have
p  (f(s; j)  en(s; j)) = 0 for every j 2 f1; : : : ; ng;
and, therefore, from the argument in the previous paragraph, we have f(s; j) = (2; 2) for
every j 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Again, by the exact feasibility of f , we have f(t; i) = (0; 2) for
every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Thus, f = gn.
We next assume that f (1)(t; i) + f (2)(t; i)  4 for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. We will show
that f = hn. Let q = (2; 1). Since f
(1)(t; i) + f (2)(t; i)  4 for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, we
have q  (f(t; i)  en(t; i))  0 for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. By the individual rationality of f ,
q  (f(s; j)  en(s; j))  0 for every j 2 f1; : : : ; ng. By the exact feasibility of f , we have
q  (f(t; i)  en(t; i)) = 0 for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng:
Therefore, f(t; i) = (0; 4) for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Again, by the exact feasibility of f ,
we have f(s; j) = (2; 0) for every j 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Therefore, f = hn. Hence, for every
n 2 Z++, CS(En) = fgn; hng.
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For every n 2 Z++, endowment allocation en is a Walras allocation under price vector
p = (1; p(2)) with 1=2 < p(2) < 2=3, but en is not a cost-minimized Walras allocation. By
summing up, for every n  2, ; 6= CS(En) = WCM(En) ( W (En) ( C(En).
We consider the limit economy of the sequence (En)n of nite economies. Let B be the
-algebra of the Borel subsets in [0; 1] and  be the Borel measure on [0; 1]. An atomless
economy E1 : ([0; 1];B; )! P  Z2+ is dened by
E1(a) =
8<: (-s; es) if a 2 [1; 1=2];(-t; et) if a 2]1=2; 1]:
From Theorem 3.1 of Inoue [2], W (E1) = C(E1) follows, and from Theorem of Inoue
[5], WCM(E1) = CS(E1) follows. Let e1 be the endowment allocation for economy E1.
Dene allocations g1 and h1 by
g1(a) =
8<: (2; 0) if a 2 [0; 1=2];(0; 4) if a 2]1=2; 1];
h1(a) =
8<: (2; 2) if a 2 [0; 1=2];(0; 2) if a 2]1=2; 1]:
Then, we have g1; h1 2 WCM(E1), e1 2 W (E1), and e1 62 WCM(E1). Therefore,
; 6= CS(E1) = WCM(E1) ( W (E1) = C(E1).
Let Bn be the algebra on [0; 1] generated by f[0; 1=(2n)]; ]1=(2n); 2=(2n)]; : : : ; ](2n  
1)=(2n); 1]g and n be the Borel measure restricted to Bn. Also, for every n 2 Z++, dene
n : [0; 1]! An by
n(a) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(s; 1) if a 2 [0; 1=(2n)];
...
(s; n) if a 2](n  1)=(2n); 1=2];
(t; 1) if a 2]1=2; (n+ 1)=(2n)];
...
(t; n) if a 2](2n  1)=(2n); 1]:
For every n 2 Z++, dene an economy ~En : ([0; 1];Bn; n)! PZ2+ by ~En(a) = En n(a)
for every a 2 [0; 1]. Since we require that allocations for ~En must be Bn-measurable,
economy ~En can be identied with economy En. Since   (E1) 1 = n  ( ~En) 1 holds
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for every n 2 Z++ and B is the -algebra generated by
S1
n=1 Bn, economy E1 can be
regarded as the limit economy of the sequence ( ~En)n. By an argument above, for every
n  2, fn  n 62 W ( ~En), fn  n 2 C( ~En), CS( ~En) = fgn  n; hn  ng = WCM( ~En),
en  n 2 W ( ~En), and en  n 62 WCM( ~En). Thus, for every n  2, ; 6= CS( ~En) =
WCM( ~En) ( W ( ~En) ( C( ~En). Hence, the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations
only in the limit atomless economy, whereas the strong core coincides with the set of cost-
minimized Walras allocations regardless of in a nite economy or in the limit atomless
economy.
Dene an allocation f1 for E1 by
f1(a) =
8<: (2; 1) if a 2 [0; 1=2];(0; 3) if a 2]1=2; 1]:
Note that n  (fn  n) 1 converges weakly to   f 11 and f1 is a Walras allocation for
E1 under price vector (3; 2). Thus, (fn n)n2 is a sequence of allocations, each of which
is not a Walras allocation for ~En, but its limit allocation f1 is a Walras allocation for the
limit atomless economy E1.
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